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I. Introduction
The problem of balancing property rights with the need to
regulate economic activity under the states' police powers is by no
means a well-settled issue of constitutional law.1 Governments
have the power, and indeed the obligation, to regulate real estate
and other economic activity in order to protect public health,
safety, and welfare.2  A growing concern for, and awareness of,
social, economic, and natural environments has led to increases in
the number and complexity of economic and social regulations
created to deal with these externalities and public needs.3 These
regulations have increasingly restricted economic and property
rights.4  For example, municipal governments have difficulty
1. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Of Mice and Missiles: A True Account of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 285, 306 (1993); Frank 1. Michelman,
Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 327 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of
Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 491-92 (1995); Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, The
Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 157-58 (1995).
The United States Supreme Court is not exempt from the uncertainty surrounding the
appropriate balance between individual property rights and state police powers. See Parking
Assoc. of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court remained divided as to the
appropriate standard of review-to be applied to regulatory takings challenges). In Parking
Assoc. of Ga., Justice Thomas, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented in the Court's denial
of a writ of certiorari. See id. Justice Thomas believed that federal and state courts did not
know whether the rough proportionality standard of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
391 (1994), applied to legislative determinations and adjudicative actions. See Parking Assoc.
of Ga., 512 U.S. at 1117-18.
2. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. See, e.g., id. (use restrictions imposed to control real estate development); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (use restrictions imposed to
preserve historical sites); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987) (use restrictions imposed on sub-surface mining operations to protect surface estates).
4. Government regulation of property and economic rights has led to numerous articles
and books on increasing constitutional protection for property and economic rights under the
due process clause. See Norman Karlin, Substantive Due Process: A Doctrine for Regulatory
Control, 13 Sw. U. L. REV. 479 (1983) [hereinafter Substantive Due Process]; RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 14 (1985);
Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627 (1988)
[hereinafter Back to the Future]; Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of
Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363 (1990) [hereinafter
Resurrecting Economic Rights]; James W. Ely, Jr., Property Rights and Liberty: Allies or
Enemies?, 22 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 703 (1992). But see James A. Kushner, Property and
Mysticism: The Legality of Exactions as a Condition for Public Development Approval in the
Time of the Rehnquist Court, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 53, 172 (1992) ("Nollan -
... represent[s] the Rehnquist Court's exhumation of the long discredited principle of
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financing capital improvements that are needed to promote and
sustain growth.5 Consequently, these costs are increasingly shifted
to real estate developers through the use of land dedication
conditions and impact fees.6 The heavy burden imposed on
landowners by these land use regulations has led to the creation of
property rights movements such as "Take Back Texas" and
referenda like Arizona's Proposition 300.' For many landowners
and real estate developers, land use and other regulations heavily
burden the exercise of their property rights. The United States
Supreme Court has often been asked to decide whether this burden
is excessive under the United States Constitution.8
This article identifies and examines the development of
regulatory takings analysis by the Supreme Court during the
Twentieth Century. The Court's analytical approach to examining
regulatory takings challenges evinces a precarious development
during this century. The Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution9 protects property rights against
excessive government regulation."0 The Court's recent interpreta-
economic substantive due process.").
5. See James C. Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence,
50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 88 (1987).
6. See id.
7. The "Take Back Texas" movement advocates legislation protecting private property
rights. Arizona's Proposition 300 would have required state agencies to analyze every health,
safety, and environmental regulation to determine the impact it would have on private
property rights. Proposition 300 was rejected in the November 1994 elections. See Dana
Clark & David Downes, What Price Biodiversity? Economic Incentives and Biodiversity
Conversion in the United States, 11 J. ENvTL. L. & LMG. 9, 75 (1996); see also Timothy
Noah, Arizona's Proposition 300 Looms Large in Property Owner's War on Regulations,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1994, at A16.
8. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. See Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897); see also
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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tion of the Takings Clause in Dolan v. City of Tigard"1 reveals the
development of another stage in the analysis of regulatory takings.
In the aftermath of Dolan, the development of the regulatory
takings analysis consists of three stages, although transitions from
one stage to another are often blurred by philosophical changes on
the Court. Part II of this article discusses the first stage in the
development of a regulatory takings analysis. This stage involves
a means-ends analysis that scrutinizes government action and
provides less deference to legislative judgment. Part III examines
the second stage which consists of an ad hoc balancing approach
that weighs conflicting public and private interests against one
another and defers to legislative judgment. As the Supreme Court
imposes a higher standard of review on government regulations and
their impact under the Takings Clause, this stage is drawing to a
close. Part IV discusses the third stage. Although it has not been
fully developed by the Court, this stage advocates heightened
11. 512 U.S. at 374. Dolan has prompted numerous law review notes and articles which
examine the Supreme Court's decision. See generally James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy,
Land Dedication Conditions and Beyond the Essential Nexus: Determining "Reasonably
Related" Impacts of Real Estate Development Under the Takings Clause, 27 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 73 (1996); Daniel A. Crane, Comment, A Poor Relation? Regulatory Takings After
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 199 (1996); David S. Ardia, Note, Dolan v. City
of Tigard: Takings Doctrine Moves onto Unpaved Ground, 24 REAL EST. L.J. 195 (1996);
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Jonathon M. Davidson, Life after Dolan: Review of the Cases, 27 URB.
LAW. 874 (1995); Linas Griskis, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Judicial Panacea to the
Takings Clause?, 31 TULSA L.J. 181 (1995); Epstein, supra, note 1; Sarah Long, Note,
Tipping the Scales for the Private Property Owner: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 STETSON L.
REV. 213 (1995); Catherine Buchanan Lehman, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard: A Heightened
Scrutiny of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1153 (1995); Kim
I. Stoller, Note, How Much is Enough? Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 193 (1995); Michael B. Dowling & A. Joseph Fadrowsky, III, Note,
Dolan v. City of Tigard, Individual Property Rights v. Land Management Systems, 17 U.
HAW. L. REV. 193 (1995); Daniel S. Huffenus, Dolan Meets Nollan Towards a Workable
Takings Test for Development Impact Exactions Cases, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 30 (1995);
Kristen P. Sosnosky, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard- A Sequel to Nollan's Essential Nexus Test
for Regulatory Takings, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1677 (1995); Kmiec, supra note 1; David Ackerly,
Note, Exactions for Transportation Corridors After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 247 (1995); Nicole M. Lugo, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Paving New Bicycle Paths
Through the Thickets of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, 48 ARK. L. REV. 823 (1995);
Stephen P. Chinn et al., Dolan v. City of Tigard: Kansas Local Governments Beware-The
Supreme Court Further Restricts the Authority of Municipalities to Condition Development
Approvals, 64 J. KANS. B. ASSoC. 30 (1995); Charles H. Clarke, Regulatory Takings, Private
Property and Public Benefits, 17 WHITIER L. REV. 21 (1995); Douglas T. Kendall & James
E. Ryan, "Paying" for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep
Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801 (1995); Rachel M. Janutis, Note, Nollan and Dolan:
"Taking" a Link Out of the Development Chain, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 981 (1994); Bernard
Schwartz, Takings Clause-"Poor Relation" No More? 47 OKLA. L. REV. 417 (1994).
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scrutiny for some land use regulations and less deference for
legislative judgments. Part IV also analyzes the constitutional
underpinnings of the mean-ends analysis of regulatory takings
jurisprudence established by the Court in Dolan. Finally, it is
concluded that Dolan signals the movement toward another stage
in the development of takings jurisprudence. Dolan establishes a
higher scrutiny for some land use regulations, initiates a type of
means-ends analysis for other regulations, and generally provides
for greater protection of property rights under the Takings Clause.
II. A Means-Ends Analysis Under the Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments state that no person is to be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without the due process of law.12 In the late Nineteenth
Century, the Supreme Court formulated the doctrine of "substan-
tive economic due process" from the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3  The formulation and
application of substantive economic due process developed from
the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York.'4 In Lochner, the
Court held that a New York statute limiting the number of hours
one could work in a bakery was unconstitutional because it violated
substantive due process. 5 However, the Court also concluded
that the state possessed limited powers to regulate economic
relationships in order to further certain social policies. 6
Under the substantive economic due process doctrine formul-
ated by Lochner, the Court considers the legitimacy of federal and
state legislation by analyzing its substantive content and reviewing
the government's power to regulate economic activities and
relations. 7 The Supreme Court applied this substantive economic
due process analysis to early state labor laws and generally found
these laws to be unconstitutional; as a result, this analysis limited
a state's exercise of its police powers. 8 The Court continued to
12. See U.S. CONST. amend V, XIV.
13. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 64.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 57-58. The Court concluded that the government regulation must be
within the state's police power and directly related to the evil it is designed to combat. See
id.
18. See Edd S. Noell, Economic Regulation and the Late Nineteenth-Century Supreme
Court: An Economic Interpretation of the Relation Between the Police Powers and Substantive
1998]
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employ the doctrine into the 1930s and held that early "New Deal"
legislation violated substantive due process.19 By the late 1930s,
the Court ceased to apply substantive due process to protect
economic and property rights;2° however, it continued to apply
substantive due process to protect fundamental rights.
21
A. The Demise of Substantive Due Process
During the Lochner era, the Supreme Court also held that
some government regulation of economic and property rights was
permissible under a substantive due process analysis. 22  However,
the Court's application of substantive economic due process was
criticized for substituting the judgment of the judiciary for the
collective judgment of the legislature.23 Eventually, the doctrine
was discredited for blocking social legislation needed to relieve the
economic and social distress of the Great Depression. 4 In West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,25 the Court indicated that it would no
longer apply the substantive due process doctrine to economic
rights and would instead defer to legislative determinations. 26 The
substantive due process doctrine, as applied to fundamental rights,
would be resurrected in United States v. Carolene Products Co.
27
In Carolene Products, the Supreme Court held that substantive
due process applies to protect fundamental rights such as freedom
of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion.28
Due Process, 30 Soc. SCI. J. 271, 274-79 (1993).
19. See Substantive Due Process, supra note 4, at 479-80.
20. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (sustaining a federal
statute excluding filled milk from interstate commerce); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining a state statute establishing a minimum wage for women); Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (sustaining a New York statute fixing the price of milk).
21. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The period from 1905 to 1937 came to be
known as the Lochner era. See Substantive Due Process, supra note 4, at 479.
22. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (permitting cities to implement
zoning).
23. See Substantive Due Process, supra note 4, at 480-81; see also Kushner, supra note
4, at 172.
24. See Substantive Due Process, supra note 4, at 497-98. See also Laurence Tribe,
Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1085 (1977).
25. 300 U.S. at 379.
26. See id. at 398-400 (marking the end of the Lochner era). Economic legislation is
valid if it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See Resurrecting
Economic Rights, supra note 4, at 1366.
27. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
28. See id. at 152 n.4.
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However, the Court failed to revive the substantive due process
doctrine to protect economic and property rights.29
Carolene Products distinguished economic and property rights
from fundamental rights.3" Giving little deference to legislative
wisdom,31 the Court applied a strict scrutiny test to conflicts
involving fundamental rights. By contrast, great deference was
given to legislative decisions that restricted or interfered with
economic and property rights.32 Several legal scholars believe that
the Supreme Court greatly erred in deciding West Coast Hotel and
Carolene Products.33 They argue that some market and develop-
ment problems existing today stem from the lesser protection
afforded to property and economic rights under this dichotomy of
liberties.34  The differentiation between property rights and
individual rights was a significant reason for landowner and
developer dissatisfaction regarding the protection of property and
economic rights under the Constitution. Professor James W. Ely,
Jr. explicitly criticized this distinction stating:
The framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights had both
utilitarian and libertarian reasons for defending property. On
one hand, they hoped that security of property rights would
generate investment capital and thus hasten the economic
development of the fledgling United States. At the same time,
drawing upon the English Whig tradition and Lockean philos-
ophy, the framers believed that one best guaranteed individual
liberty by restraining the exercise of governmental power.
Protection of property rights served to create a realm of
individual autonomy and thus protect citizens from potentially
coercive government . *...36
29. See id. at 152. But see discussion infra notes 161-174. In Dolan, Justice Stevens
argued that the Court is reasserting the substantive due process doctrine by establishing a
means-ends analysis under the Takings Clause. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
406-07 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53.
31. See id.
32. See id. See also West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937).
33. These scholars contend that the assumption underlying the Supreme Court's decision
in West Coast Hotel and Carolene Products-that government regulation is needed to
promote public welfare-is flawed. See, e.g., Back to the Future, supra note 4, at 629; see also
Resurrecting Economic Rights, supra note 4, at 1371-72.
34. See, e.g., Resurrecting Economic Rights, supra note 4, at 1371; Substantive Due
Process, supra note 4, at 480; Ely, Jr., supra note 4, at 707.
35. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
36. Ely, Jr., supra note 4, at 703.
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Notwithstanding the criticism received from numerous scholars
and commentators, substantive due process remained powerless to
protect economic and property rights.37 As the Lochner era drew
to a close, the Court fashioned the regulatory takings doctrine
which gave limited protection to property rights under the Takings
Clause.
3 8
B. The Creation of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine
The regulatory takings doctrine was established by the
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.39 Pennsyl-
vania Coal involved a conflict between the rights of an individual
property owner and the need for government regulation to protect
the public's interest.4" The Pennsylvania Coal Company (the
"Company") sold a parcel of land but explicitly retained the right
to mine the coal on the parcel.41 When the Company notified the
landowner that it was commencing mining operations, the land-
owner attempted to invoke a recently passed Pennsylvania statute
that prohibited sub-surface mining causing subsidence under
residential dwellings.42  The Supreme Court held that the anti-
subsidence legislation was a taking of the Company's property and
an interference with a private contract.43
In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court noted that sometimes-when
states exercise their police powers by regulating land use to protect
public health, safety, and welfare-the regulation often reduces the
value of the property." The Court further noted that when the
diminished value of the land is incidental to the regulation, the
property owner need not be compensated. Conversely, the
Court recognized that a land use regulation may impose a heavy
burden on a landowner which could, in fact, approximate the
37. See Substantive Due Process, supra note 4, at 481.
38. See Ely, Jr., supra note 4, at 706.
39. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
40. See id. at 413.
41. See id. at 412.
42. See id. at 412-13.
43. See id. at 413-14. Approximately 57 years later, the Supreme Court upheld a
Pennsylvania anti-subsidence law. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470 (1987). The Court emphasized the changed circumstances evident in Keystone. See
id. at 488. For one, Keystone was a facial challenge rather than an applied challenge. See
id. at 474. Generally, a facial takings challenge is more difficult to sustain. See id.
44. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
45. See id. at 413-14.
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burden under eminent domain.46 Justice Holmes, writing for the
Majority, concluded that:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone.
One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the
extent of diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question
depends upon the particular facts.47
Justice Holmes stated that a regulatory taking should be deter-
mined based on the particular facts of a case; thus, he fashioned the
regulatory takings analysis on a case-by-case basis.48 The Supreme
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See id at 413. Some scholars believe that the regulatory takings doctrine should be
applied in place of subtantative due process to limit the regulation of economic activity. One
legal scholar argues that Justice Holmes, in his Pennsylvania Coal opinion, was adding
another remedy to be used with substantive due process. See Frank R. Strong, On Placing
Property Due Process Center Stage in Takings Jurisprudence, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 591 (1988).
Thus, the substantive due process analysis should be used first to determine if the regulation
is without police power authority. See id. at 593-94. If the regulation were found to be an
unlawful exercise of the state's power authority, simply declaring the regulation to be void
would be an inadequate remedy. See id. at 593. Permitting a regulatory takings claim would
provide monetary relief and more adequately compensate the injured party. See id.
Other legal scholars argue that the Takings Clause was never intended to be
interpreted as it was in Pennsylvania Coal. See Fred Brosselman, et al., The Taking Issue,
in U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973). But see
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (considered to be the first inverse
condemnation suit). In Pumpelly, the landowner's property was flooded as a result of a dam
on a lake. The landowner sought compensation for the damages to this property. See id.
at 167. The dam builder contended that the dam was a government project. See id. at 174.
The dam builder further argued that the overflow of the lake caused by the dam was
incidental to the legitimate government project and that the land was not really taken. See
id. at 175. The Court concluded that:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a provision
of constitutional law, always understood to have been adopted for protection and
security to the rights of the individual as against the government, and which has
received the commendation of jurists, statesmen and commentators, as placing the
just principles of the common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary
legislation to change or control them, it shall be held that if the government
refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it
can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any
extent; can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making a compensa-
19981
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Court's ad hoc approach to determining whether a regulatory
taking has occurred has made this form of constitutional jurispru-
dence a source of confusion and controversy.
III. An Ad Hoc Balancing Test Under the Takings Clause
The ad hoc approach to deciding the regulatory takings issue
has caused considerable confusion as to when or how much a
regulation can reduce the value and restrict use of property without
requiring compensation for the landowner. Several cases establish
principles of takings law that was applied by federal and state
courts to balance conflicting public interests and private inter-
ests.49 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City5° is
one such case.
In Penn Central, Penn Central Transportation Company
("Penn Central") wanted to sell the air space above Grand Central
Station to a developer who was planning to build an office building
on top of the station.51 New York City declared the station to be
an historic landmark and refused permission to alter the appear-
ance of this landmark.52 Penn Central sued New York City
claiming that a regulatory taking had occurred.53 The New York
Court of Appeals disagreed with Penn Central and the developer
holding that historical preservation did not constitute a taking of
private property. 4  The Supreme Court similarly held that
application of New York's historic preservation ordinance was not
a regulatory taking.5
tion, because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public
use. Such a construction would pervert the constitutional provision into a
restriction upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights stood at the common law,
instead of the government, and make it an authority for invasion of private right
under the pretext of public good, which has no warrant in the law or practices of
our ancestors.
Id. at 177-78. Obviously, the Court rejected the builder's argument; instead, the Court held
that the land flooded by construction of the dam was a taking requiring the government to
justly compensate the property owner. See id. at 182.
49. See discussion infra notes 50-93.
50. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
51. See id. at 116-17.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 119.
54. See id. at 121-22.
55. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
[Vol. 102:2
REGULATORY TAKINGS ANALYSIS
Penn Central was a landmark decision because it established
the validity of historic preservation statutes;56 however, it was far
more important in takings jurisprudence for its analysis. Penn
Central created a three-pronged test to determine whether land use
regulations are regulatory takings in violation of the Takings
Clause.57 Furthermore, Penn Central established a deferential
balancing test that ultimately permitted the government to exercise
its police powers to expand land use regulations."
A. Weighing Conflicting Public Needs Against Private Property
Rights
The gap between a regulatory taking and a legitimate
regulation that does not require compensation is often large. In
Penn Central, the Supreme Court established a three-pronged test
to determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred when the
legitimacy of the taking is in question.59 The Court considered the
following: (1) the nature of the government action;' (2) the
economic impact of the regulation;" and (3) the interference with
the landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations.
62
The analytical framework, or perhaps the lack thereof, has made
Penn Central infamous for its ability to breed seemingly endless
confusion about regulatory takings analysis. Recently, the Supreme
Court has focused on the first factor of the Penn Central test.63
The remaining two factors, however, are immersed in confusion
and require a more thorough factual-based analysis.' 4
56. See id.
57. See id. at 124.
58. See discussion infra notes 134-47.
59. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 124; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
62. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. There are two types of taking challenges. See
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In a facial challenge,
the landowner argues that the statute on its face is a regulatory taking in violation of the
Takings Clause. See id. at 474. The landowner has an almost insurmountable burden to
overcome in order to establish a facial challenge. See id. In an as-applied challenge, the
landowner argues that the government regulation unreasonably restricts the use or demands
an interest in property that affects or constitutes a regulatory taking. See Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 124-25.
63. See discussion infra notes 65-133.
64. See generally supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting the debate concerning
greater protection for private property rights versus the economic impact of government land
use regulation).
1998]
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Under the first factor, analyzing the nature of the government
action, the Supreme Court requires that the government regulations
not "deny all economically viable use, 65 of the property and must
"substantially advance a legitimate state interest." 66 The principle
65. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138).
However, the Supreme Court did not apply the principle until Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
66. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
The Court requires per se application of heightened scrutiny to government takings in
two instances. First, when the government action constitutes "permanent physical
occupation" of privately owned property. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982). The second instance occurs when a government action denies a
landowner all "economically viable use" of its property. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032.
The per se rule against physical occupation shows the Court's willingness to protect the
right to exclude others and promote exclusive use. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36. In
Loretto, a New York statute required landlords to permit a cable television company to
install its CATV facilities on their property with the maximum charge to be set by a
commission. See id. at 421. Plaintiff, who owned a five story apartment building in New
York, brought a class action suit for damages and injunctive relief in New York alleging a
taking without just compensation. See id. at 424. The trial court granted summary judgment
to Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corporation and the Appellate Division affirmed. See
id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320 (N.Y. 1980)).
The court of appeals concluded that the statute enabled better communication which, in turn,
produced important educational and community benefits-a legitimate public purpose. See
id. at 425. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. See id. at 442. Justice
Marshall, writing for the Majority, opined that a physical intrusion by the government was
a property restriction of an unusually serious character. See id. at 433. A permanent
physical occupation of real property has always been found to be a taking even if it achieves
an important public benefit. See id. at 426. The Court noted that such a harsh regulation
did not just take a strand from the bundle of rights but cut across the whole bundle. See id.
at 435-36. Under Loretto's per se rule, any regulation that requires permanent physical
occupation of privately owned land would automatically be found to be a taking. See id. at
426.
In addition, land use regulations that completely diminish the value of the land are per
se violations of the Takings Clause. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-30. In Lucas, developer
David Lucas owned two vacant oceanfront lots in a residential subdivision on the Isle of
Palms, a South Carolina barrier island near Charleston, on which he intended to build houses
similar to those on immediately adjacent parcels. See id. at 1008. Before he could begin the
development process, South Carolina passed the Beachfront Management Act (the "Act")
that prohibited the construction of any permanent structure except for a small deck or
walkway within the critical beach/dune area. See id. Lucas' land was within the critical area,
and he was denied the right to construct houses on those lots. See id.
Lucas did not challenge the validity of the Act, but he asserted that the regulation
denied him of all "economically viable use" of his land and, thus, was a regulatory taking of
property for which he should receive compensation. Id. at 1009. The trial court held that
Lucas was deprived of all economically viable use of his land and awarded him approxi-
mately $1.2 million as just compensation for the taking. See id. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina reversed the decision and held that the Act was enacted to prevent serious
public harm and was a legitimate use of the state police powers to protect public safety. See
id. (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)). The Supreme Court, relying on the
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that government regulations must "substantially advance a
legitimate state interest" created the issue for the Supreme Court's
decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.67 In Nollan,
the Court initiated a new analytical approach to regulatory takings
analysis.
68
B. Relating the Regulation to a Legitimate Interest
Although the Court applied an ad hoc factual inquiry approach
to examine the nature of government action in Penn Central,69 its
decision in Nollan implicitly relies on a different constitutional
doctrine that would eventually support a more pronounced
regulatory takings analysis.7" This analysis more broadly examines
land use and other regulations that restrict the use, development,
and management of land to advance public interests.71
In Nollan, the owners of a beachfront lot in California
customarily rented a small bungalow on the property to summer
vacationers. 72  After years of such rental use, the building had
fallen into disrepair and could no longer be rented.73 In keeping
with the rest of the neighborhood, the landowners sought a permit
to demolish the existing bungalow and replace it with a three-
bedroom house.74 The California Coastal Commission granted the
permit subject to the condition that the landowners grant an
easement on the property in favor of public access to the beach.
The landowners objected and challenged the condition as a
regulatory taking.76 The California trial court concluded that the
condition was not a legitimate exercise of the state's police
powers. 77 The California Court of Appeal reversed holding that
the dedication, which was a demand for an easement, maximized
public access to the beach and was rationally related to increasing
findings of the trial court, held that the Act denied Lucas of all economically viable use of
his land and was, therefore, a per se taking. See id. at 1015-18. For general commentary on
the implications of Lucas, see Michelman, supra note 1 and Mandelker, supra note 1.
67. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
68. See discussion infra Part III.B.
69. 438 U.S. at 124.
70. See discussion infra Part IV.C (unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
71. See discussion infra notes 118-47.
72. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 828.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 829.
77. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829.
19981
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
beach access under California law.78 Upon petition by the
landowners, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of a
conditional demand for an easement was a regulatory taking.79
Justice Scalia, writing for the Majority, noted that a regulation
requiring permanent physical occupation was generally a taking;8 °
however, the conditional demand imposed on the Nollan's land was
not such a physical occupation." Nevertheless, the landowners
were not required to grant the easement across their property.
The Nollan Court noted that a land use regulation must
"substantially advance a legitimate state interest."82  Although
increasing public access to the beach was a legitimate state
interest,83 the imposition of an easement along the beachfront
lacked an essential (causal) nexus to that interest' and, thus,
failed to "substantially advance a legitimate state interest." 5
Justice Scalia stated:
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to be more
than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more
than an exercise in cleverness and imagination. As indicated
earlier, our cases describe the condition for the abridgement of
property rights through the police power as a "substantial
advanc[ing]" of a legitimate state interest. We are inclined to
be particularly careful about the adjective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a
land use restriction, since in that context there is heightened
risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation require-
ment, rather than the stated police power objective.86
78. See id. at 830-31.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 831-32; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
81. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32. The Nollan decision has generated much scholarly
commentary. See, e.g., Kushner, supra note 4; Back to the Future, supra note 4; Michael H.
Crew, Development Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987), 22 URB. LAW. 23 (1990); Note, Staring Down the Barrel of Nollan: Can the Coastal
Commission Dodge the Bullet, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 579 (1987); Note, Where is the Supreme
Court Heading in Its Taking Analysis and What Impact Will This Direction Have on
Municipalities?, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585 (1988); Note, Taking a Step Back: A Recon-
sideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 448 (1988).
82. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
83. See id. at 836,
84. See id. at 837.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 841.
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Nollan bifurcates the first prong of Penn Central's ad hoc
approach87 that requires the regulation to substantially advance a
legitimate state interest.88 First, there must be an essential nexus
between the purpose to be advanced and the regulation imposed.89
Second, there must be a degree of connection between the exaction
and the impact of the proposed development.9 ° The Nollan Court
found California's level of scrutiny under the Takings Clause too
loose to review.9' The Court remained silent on the required
degree of connection making the reasonably related standard the
key issue in future challenges to land dedication conditions.92 The
Court's silence was thunderously broken in Dolan v. City of
Tigard.9 This further established a shift in regulatory takings
analysis.
IV. An Analysis of Land Use Regulations Advancing State
Interests
Land dedication conditions and fees in lieu of dedication
require landowners to surrender their interests in land or pay
money to local governments for occupancy, building, or construc-
tion permits.94 Some landowners and developers challenge the
connection between the dedication conditions and the municipal-
ity's need for the dedication. 95  Developers and landowners
frequently discover that findings do not show a sufficient degree of
connection between the conditions and the impact of their develop-
ments on local infrastructure and public facilities.96 Dolan v. City
of Tigard is an example of one landowner's dissatisfaction with
such dedication conditions.
In Dolan, the landowner owned a building on a 1.67 acre tract
in downtown Tigard, Oregon (the "City").' The landowner
87. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
88. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35.
89. See id.; see generally Kushner, supra note 4, at 160-171 & nn.501-57 (cases applying
Nollan's essential nexus test).
90. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
91. See id. at 838.
92. See id.
93. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). See also Curtin, Jr. & Davidson, supra note 11 (reviewing
federal and state cases applying Dolan).
94. See Nicholas, supra note 5.
95. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 379.
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applied to the City for a permit to remove the existing building, to
construct a new building, and to expand the existing parking lot.98
The City granted the application but imposed two dedication
conditions.99 One demanded that the landowner dedicate a
portion of her land lying within the one hundred year flood plain
for the improvement of a storm water drainage system.1"' The
City further demanded that the landowner dedicate an additional
fifteen foot strip of land adjacent to the flood plain for the
construction of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.0 1 The landowner
objected to the land dedication conditions and requested a
variance. 10 2  In requesting the variance, the landowner did not
challenge the legitimacy of the City's goals but believed that she
should not be required to transfer a portion of her property to the
City in exchange for a building permit to expand her retail
business.0 3  The landowner maintained that her proposed
development would not conflict with the policies of the City's
comprehensive plan.
A. Justifying the Relationship Between Dedications and Public
Goals
When the variance was denied, the landowner challenged the
conditions imposed by the City as a regulatory taking." The
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379.
101. See id. at 379-80. Under the City's comprehensive land use plan, a property owner
was required to leave 15% of a parcel undeveloped for open space and landscaping
requirements. See id. at 380. In addition, the City's Master Drainage Plan recommended
improvements to the Fanno Creek Basin to improve storm water runoff and reduce flooding.
See id. at 378. One recommendation of the Drainage Plan called for the flood plain to be
preserved as a greenway. See id. The City and landowners on the Creek would share the
cost of the improvements as each received benefits. See id. The Fanno Creek flood plain
is virtually unusable for commercial development. See id. at 379. The City's comprehensive
plan made the flood plain part of the City's greenway system and also adopted other recom-
mendations of the Drainage Plan. See id. at 378.
The City also conducted a transportation study. See id. at 377-78. This study
identified traffic congestion in the Central Business District where the landowner's retail
business was located. See id. The study recommended that the City adopt a plan for a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway in the Central Business District. See id. Accordingly, the City's
comprehensive plan required that new developments in the Central Business District
dedicate land for these pathways. See id. at 378.
102. See id. at 380.
103. See id. at 380-81.
104. See id. at 382.
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Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals ("LUBA") and the Oregon
Court of Appeals affirmed the validity of the imposition of the
conditions on the development of the landowner's parcel.
105
LUBA and the court of appeals each applied a reasonable
relationship test in its analysis of the landowner's case and found
a sufficient relationship between the dedication conditions and the
City's need to reduce flooding and improve transportation.1
6
The Supreme Court of Oregon also applied the reasonable
relationship test in its analysis.107 The reasonable relationship test
requires a reasonable connection between the dedication conditions
and the impact of the development in order to find the regulation
valid.0 8 The reasonable relationship test, which has been adopt-
ed by a majority of the courts,0 9 defers to the local government's
judgment and, thus, presumes constitutional validity of the
regulation.110 Under this test, landowners' challenges have been
largely unsuccessful because courts rely heavily on the judgment of
government officials and policy-makers.' The court found that
a reasonable relationship existed between the projected impacts of
the development and the required dedications." 2 Furthermore,
the court held that the dedication conditions were legitimate
105. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 382-83.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 383.
108. See id. (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 443 (Or. 1993)).
109. See id. at 390-91.
110. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91.
111. See R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community
Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions,
50 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5, 5-6 (1987). Municipal governments have often imposed
dedication conditions on the issuance of building permits for development. See id. at 5-6.
Landowners and real estate developers frequently challenge the validity of the land use
regulations requiring these dedications. See id. at 9-10. They were often unsuccessful in
federal and state courts. See id. at 10. In resolving these challenges, state courts established
three standards of review that were applied to determine the required degree of connection
between exactions and the impact of development. See id. at 11-14. Some states apply the
rational relationship test which merely requires generalized statements as to the necessary
connection between the required dedication and the proposed development. See Dolan, 512
U.S. at 389. Some states take an intermediate position and require local government to show
a "reasonable relationship" between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed
property development. See id. at 390. A minority of states apply an exacting scrutiny known
as the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test. See id. at 389-390. This test requires that
if the local government cannot demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the
specifically created need, the exaction becomes a "veiled exercise of the power of eminent
domain and confiscation of private property behind the defense of police regulations." Id.
112. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383.
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exercises of state's police powers and, thus, constituted a valid land
use regulation under the Takings Clause. 3
The landowner disagreed and appealed to the United States
Supreme Court arguing that the Oregon Supreme Court should
have applied a substantial relationship test as required by Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission."4 The landowner argued that
the "essential nexus" test of Nollan called for a "substantial
relationship" between the dedication and its impact and, therefore,
required the Oregon Supreme Court to apply a higher level of
scrutiny."' The Supreme Court had never explicitly addressed
the issue of whether the burden imposed on landowners by
development impact exactions required heightened scrutiny under
the Takings Clause. The Court had only addressed situations
where land use regulations created a physical occupation" 6 or
denied all economically viable use of the land.117
B. The Creation of a Closer Connection Between Regulation and
Goals
In Dolan, the Supreme Court observed that Nollan applied
heightened scrutiny to the land dedication condition."' The
Court had concluded in Nollan that for a land dedication condition
to "substantially advance a legitimate state interest," it must bear
an essential (causal) nexus to the public purpose."9 The Dolan
Court declared that if the land use regulation meets the essential
nexus test, the next step is to determine if the "required relation-
ship" exists between the regulation and the projected impact of the
development.' The Court established the "degree of connec-
tion" analysis referring to it as a "rough proportionality."'' The
Court stated: "No precise mathematical calculation is required, but
113. See id.
114. See id. (citing 483 U.S. 825 (1987)).
115. See id.
116. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). See also
supra note 71 and accompanying text.
117. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See also supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
118. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.
119. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. In Nollan, however, the dedication condition failed to
meet the essential nexus test. Consequently, the Court did not attempt to establish a
sufficient relationship between the purpose of condition and ends achieved by imposing the
condition. See id. at 838.
120. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388.
121. See id. at 319.
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the city must make some sort of individualized determination that
the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development."' 22 The Court concluded
that the City possessed legitimate state interests in the prevention
of flooding and reducing traffic congestion.123 However, the
Court further reasoned that the City failed to show the required
relationship between the dedications and the goals sought by the
City.24 As a result, the dedications could not stand.'25
In applying the rough proportionality test to the flood plain
easement, the Court found that the easement would completely
subsume the landowner's ability to exclude others from a portion
of her retail site.'26 The City would, therefore, gain a permanent
public easement, and the landowner would lose all control of the
land in the easement.127 The Court admitted that the flood plain
easement provided recreational benefits to the public128 but,
nonetheless, held the City's easement invalid. The Court refused
to tie the recreational benefits of the easement with the City's goal
of reducing flooding stating that the City failed to make an
"individualized determination to support" the need for the
recreational benefits.1 29 The City simply did not demonstrate the
required nexus between the flood plain easement, with its recre-
ational benefits, and the goal of reducing flooding.3 '
The Supreme Court held that local government findings in
support of land dedication conditions must illustrate the "degree of
connection" between the exactions imposed by the condition and
the impact of the development. 31 These findings must show that
the "degree of exactions" is justified by the kind and quality of
impact created by the proposed development. 3 2 These findings
must also demonstrate that the exactions actually correct the
122. Id.
123. See id. at 387-88.
124. See id. at 394-95.
125. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395.
126. See id. at 393.
127. See id. at 394.
128. See id. at 394-95.
129. See id. at 393.
130. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 394-95. With respect to the pedestrian/bicycle easement, the
Court concluded that the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the increased
pedestrian and bicycle traffic generated by the landowner's development would be alleviated





problems created by the development serving as a justification for
the public goals established by the municipal governments.
33
Although Dolan leaves unsettled the standard of review to be
applied to legislative actions,3 4 the rough proportionality test
represents the application of heightened scrutiny under the Takings
Clause to adjudicative actions.a35  The rough proportionality test
would make it difficult for legislative actions to pass constitutional
muster when compared with a highly deferential "reasonable
relationship" test.'36 In Dolan, the Court made clear that it did
not want the rough proportionality test to be confused with the
highly deferential rational basis test of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court appeared to severely undermine the validity of the
highly deferential reasonable relationship test in a few circumst-
ances, but the Court remained silent as to the scope of the rough
proportionality test by failing to address the application of the test
to development impact exactions in general and legislative
determinations.
137
In Dolan, the Court explicitly noted that the City of Tigard
used an adjudicative decision, and not a legislative determination,
to impose its land dedication condition.'38 Consequently, the
nature of the government decision-making process could limit the
application of the rough proportionality standard in future
cases."' Land use dedication conditions and other development
133. See id.
134. See id. at 385. See also, Kmiec, supra note 1 (concluding that the difference
between use restrictions and conditional demands is a matter of degree and does not justify
limits on the application of Nollan and Dolan); see generally discussion infra note 139.
135. See Dolan, 512 U.S at 395; see also supra notes 124-140 and accompanying text.
Professor Richard Epstein noted that the rough proportionality test, an intermediate standard
of review, is "one notch higher than" the rational basis test making it difficult for cities to
invoke harm as a justification for overly broad use restrictions. See Epstein, supra note 1,
at 491.
136. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390-91.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 391 n.8. The conditions were imposed by the City Planning Commission,
an adjudicative body. See id.
139. See Parking Assoc. of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Ga. 1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995). In Parking Assoc., the Supreme Court of Georgia
concluded that a landscaping requirement imposed on a parking lot permit did not raise the
same issue as a conditional demand imposed on building permit. See id. at 203 n.3. The
court found that the landscaping requirement was a legislative decision and that the condi-
tional demand in Dolan was adjudicative decision. See id. The court held that Dolan did
not apply to a legislative determination. See id. On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether Dolan applied to a more traditional legislative regulation, i.e., aesthetic
or landscaping requirements. See Parking Assoc. of Ga., 515 U.S. at 116. It refused to do
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impact exactions are quite commonly used by municipal govern-
ments."4  Although these exactions are identified under com-
prehensive and other land use schemes, they are commonly
attached to landowners' requests for building and construction
permits thereby becoming adjudicative decisions.'
Most significantly, Dolan altered the burden of proof in
challenges to land dedication conditions and some other land use
regulations. 42  The Court indicated that when a municipal gov-
ernment has made an adjudicative decision to impose a condition
or a conditional demand on a building permit, the burden of proof
to justify the dedication rests with government.
4 3
so. See id. The Supreme Court does not seem willing to declare Dolan the standard of
review for all regulatory takings challenges. See id. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
O'Conner, dissented in the Court's decision to deny certiorari. See id.
This issue, whether Dolan applies to legislative determinations, has been raised in
several other federal and state cases. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr.
2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), vacated and remanded, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994), rev'd in part and
affd in part, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (finding that Dolan does not apply to legislative
determinations); Southeast Cass Water Resource Dist. v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 527
N.W.2d 884 (N.D. 1995) (holding that Dolan does not apply to legislative actions); Harris v.
City of Wichita, 862 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1994), aff d, 74 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that Dolan does not apply to legislative actions). But see Trimen Development
Co. v. King City, 877 P.2d 187 (Wash. 1994) (applying Dolan to legislative determinations);
Shultz v. Grants Pass, 884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that Dolan applies to
legislative determinations).
140. See supra note Ili and accompanying text.
141. See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374. Shortly after deciding Dolan, the Supreme
Court vacated judgments and remanded two cases to their respective state courts instructing
these courts to apply Dolan. The first case was Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr.
2d. at 468, vacated and remanded, 512 U.S. at 1231, rev'd in part and affd in part, 911 P.2d
at 429. Ehrlich involved a regulatory taking challenge contesting the validity of land
dedication conditions, fees in lieu of dedication, and impact fees. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at
434-35. On remand, the California Court of Appeal did not change its decision nor publish
an opinion. See id. at 433. The Supreme Court of California agreed to review Ehrlich. See
id. The court held that Dolan applied to special, discretionary exactions but did not apply
to dedications that impose aesthetics control. See id. at 447, 450.
The second case remanded to apply Dolan was Oregon Dep't of Transp. v. Altimus,
862 P.2d 109 (Or. Ct. App. 1993), vacated and remanded, 513 U.S. 801 (1994). In Altimus,
the value of the land taken was at issue. See id. at 110. An expert witness testified that, in
his judgment, the value of the right of way taken was based on a statutory provision that the
town could require dedication of a portion of land to road improvement projects upon
annexation. See id. Defense witnesses further testified that if re-zoned, the property would
significantly increase in value. See id. The landowner believed that the policy forcing
property owners to dedicate a portion of their land upon annexation was unconstitutional.
See id. The Oregon Court of Appeals remanded the case. See Oregon Dep't of Transp. v.
Altimus, 905 P.2d 258, 263 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
142. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8.
143. See id.
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the Majority for taking
away the presumption of constitutional validity traditionally
afforded to adjudicative decisions and, thereby, denying govern-
ment agencies deference for their decisions.144  Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Majority, indicated that shifting the
burden in this situation was a limited exception. 145 Assuming that
shifting the burden of proof to the government applied only to
adjudicative actions, Dolan includes a narrow range of circumst-
ances that would limit application of the rough proportionality
standard.1" The placement of the burden of proof affects the
outcome of takings litigation and may affect the willingness of
landowners to challenge government regulations.
147
C. The Constitutional Underpinnings of Heightened Scrutiny
Dolan indicates a shift in takings jurisprudence because the
Court explicitly applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
protect the right to receive just compensation.'" In applying the
doctrine, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that: "[G]overnment may
not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the
right to receive just compensation when property is taken for public
use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by govern-
ment where the property sought has little or no relationship to the
benefit."1
49
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine applied even though
the government may withhold a benefit altogether. 5°  The
doctrine was formulated by the Lochner court in order to protect
the rights of the individual from coercive government actions and
to prevent the government from doing indirectly what it was
forbidden to do directly."' The doctrine has been invoked in
144. See id. at 410-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 391 n.8.
146. See id.; see also supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
147. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 410-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 385. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine "holds that government may
not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right even
if the government may withhold that benefit altogether." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989).
149. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
150. See id.
151. See Sullivan, supra note 148, at 1416.
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recent years to protect rights such as the freedom of speech and
freedom of religion.
152
In his dissent to Dolan, Justice Stevens argued that it was
inappropriate to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in
this case because Dolan involved business regulation as opposed to
fundamental rights.53 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Majority, responded to Justice Stevens' criticism by observing that
the Fifth Amendment is as much a part of the Constitution as the
First Amendment or any other amendment. 54 Although dicta,
the Court's observation tacitly indicated an increased concern for
the protection of private property or, perhaps, both property and
economic rights under the Takings Clause.'55
Justice Stevens also argued that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine did not apply to the facts of Dolan.'56 In considering the
landowner's predicament, Justice Stevens found that the exchange
of dedications for a building permit was a mutually beneficial
transaction between the landowner and the city.157 Although the
potential for government coercion or extortion was evident, Justice
Stevens ignored that threat when the landowner voluntarily
surrenders property in response to a conditional demand.158
Other scholars and judges shared mixed opinions regarding the
effects of government coercion. Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan
looked at the degree of government coercion as one of the factors
to be considered in applying the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine and found a wide range of opinions. 59 One theory,
expressed by Richard Posner, believes that both the robber and
victim exercise free will when the victim gives his or her money to
a highwayman who points a gun at them and says, "Your purse or
your life.""16 Posner theorizes that most people would gladly give
up their purse rather than lose their lives, thus, avoiding coercive
152. See id. (pointing out that the doctrine has been inconsistently applied by the
Supreme Court making its application problematic).
153. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 407-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
154. See id. at 392.
155. See generally Schwartz, supra note 11; Crane, supra note 11.
156. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 408-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. See id.
158. See id. at 408.
159. See Sullivan, supra note 148, at 1433.
160. See id. at 1446 (citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 101 (3d ed.
1986)).
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transactions per se. 6' Other scholars argue that all transactions
are coerced by the legal system because many people would steal
or take goods by force if they could. 6 2 Therefore, Justice Stevens
does not stand alone in finding that some coercion is reasonable in
mutually beneficial transactions.
Justice Stevens also criticized the Majority's opinion for
applying the previously discredited "substantive due process
analysis."' 63 The Supreme Court may indeed be using a form of
substantive economic due process. If so, the Court's application of
substantive economic due process represents a significant shift in
constitutional doctrine." The Court would be applying height-
ened scrutiny to government regulations that unreasonably restrict
or interfere with property rights.'65 At the same time, the Court
would be positioning itself to provide more protection to economic
rights that were given greater protection under substantive
economic due process analysis.'66
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1446-47.
163. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed that
the Supreme Court applied an economic due process analysis in Dolan stating:
One can only hope that the Court's reliance today on First Amendment cas-
es ... and its candid disavowal of the term "rational basis" to describe its new
standard of review ... do not signify a reassertion of the kind of super legislative
power the Court exercised during the [Lochner] era ....
In its application of what is essentially the doctrine of substantive due
process, the Court confuses the past with the present ....
Id. at 409-10.
164. See supra notes 12-38 and accompanying text. Professor Daniel R. Mandelker stated
that "Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council... may be a foretaste of doctrinal revision
that substantially and improperly enhances the protection of property under the takings
clause. If so, Lucas may turn out to be a destructive missile indeed." Mandelker, supra note
1, at 306.
165. See supra notes 12-38 and accompanying text. Dolan was not a surprise to some
scholars and commentators who concluded that Nollan and Dolan strongly suggested that
the Supreme Court was changing its takings doctrine. See Mandelker, supra note 1, at 306.
Professor Mandelker noted that the Court correctly eliminated the "harm/benefit rule" but
incorrectly eliminated the "presumption of constitutionality" for local and state land use
regulations in Lucas. See id. at 293-95, 298-99.
166. See supra notes 12-38 and accompanying text. Commentators and scholars are not
certain that Nollan and Dolan apply to traditional land use regulations such as zoning and
use restrictions. Some of them explicitly suggest that the Court needs to require heightened
scrutiny in regulatory taking challenges to traditional land use regulations and use
restrictions. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 491; Kmiec, supra note 1, at 157-58. One scholar
believed that the Court, with a majority of conservative judges, gives great concern to
property rights and their protection. He stated: "When judges mount the bench for whom
property figures strongly as basic human interests and constitutional concern, we can expect
to find them similarly clearing out spaces in Our Federalism for national enforcement of
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V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion1 67 and Dolan v. City of Tigard68 did not resurrect the sub-
stantive due process analysis of Lochner v. New York.1 69  How-
ever, it slightly eroded the distinction between fundamental rights
and property rights as set forth in United States v. Carolene
Products Co.' by applying the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine to protect the right to receive just compensation. The Court's
observation that the Fifth Amendment is just as much a part of the
Constitution as the other amendments supports this rationale.
Although Dolan and Nollan are adjudicative decisions, the Court
did not give great deference to legislative judgment in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,17" ' a legislative determination that
was repugnant to the Takings Clause.' Perhaps, it eroded some
logic of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.173 To pass constitutional
muster under Lochner's economic due process analysis, courts had
to find the statute to be within the scope of the police powers and
then find that the statute was directly related to the evil it is
designed to combat. 74 This analysis is a means-ends test that
gives less deference to municipal and state regulation of land and
business.
The essential nexus and rough proportionality tests may be the
foundation to the development of a means-ends analysis under the
regulatory takings doctrine. Dolan increases the level of scrutiny
property rights." Michelman, supra note 1, at 303. Moreover, Professor Mandelker
questioned whether the Court was willing to continue to embrace the "pragmatic case-by-
case balancing under the Penn Central test" when it opted for a per se test in Lucas.
Mandelker, supra note 1, at 306.
167. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
168. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
169. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
170. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
171. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
172. See Mandelker, supra note 1, at 286; Kmiec, supra note 1, at 152-53; Michelman,
supra note 1, at 316-17.
Some commentators suggested that Dolan is a response to state courts' efforts to
nullify Nollan by finding an essential nexus in most circumstances. See Epstein, supra note
1, at 492; Kmiec, supra note 1, at 150-51. Other commentators and scholars believed that
the Court's approach in Lucas and Nollan eroded too much state police power and other
policy-making authority of the states. See Mandelker, supra note 1, at 293-301; Michehman,
supra note 1, at 324-27.
173. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
174. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57-58.
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to be applied to development exactions and, perhaps, to a much
wider range of land use regulations.175 The rough proportionality
standard invalidates other standards of review that have been
applied in most states when courts are scrutinizing the nature of
government action.'76 Furthermore, a type of heightened scrutiny
is apparently required; this is evidenced by the application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to protect the right to receive
just compensation that limits regulation of property interests.
177
Dolan is a step towards the establishment a regulatory takings
analysis which scrutinizes the means as well as the ends of a land
use regulation.
The Court states that no mathematical precision is necessary
when using the rough proportionality test but gives virtually no
guidance as to how the rough proportionality test applies to affect
constitutional limitations on the exercise of a state's police
powers. 78  In two instances, the Court examined development
impact exactions and found that those exactions do not directly
advance the declared public interests. 179  The scope of a court's
examination is potentially broad if the rough proportionality
standard is applied to both legislative and adjudicative deci-
sions."' However, this issue remains unclear in takings jurispru-
dence.18' Takings analysis falls short of reviewing the policy goals
behind regulations but closely examines the relationships between
means and ends of the regulation.'82 Dolan leaves open the
175. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 402-11 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 390-91.
177. See id. at 386; see also Sullivan, supra note 148, at 1416-19.
178. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391-96; see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 69-141 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. Commentators and scholars disagree
on how to respond to Nollan and Dolan. They find a renewed effort to balance the exercise
of property rights and state police powers and a continuing uncertainty regarding limits on
the exercise of police power authority in making land use regulations. See Kmiec, supra note
1, at 158 (finding that the Court resolves the takings puzzle in Dolan); Epstein, supra note
1, at 492 (concluding that uncertainty surrounds takings law and its development in the
aftermath of Dolan.). Other scholars and commentators suggested that the Court is going
too far, to the point of disturbing state-federal relations. See Mandelker, supra note 1, at
305-06 (hypothesizing that the Court incorrectly eliminated the presumption of constitutional
validity that had been given to state and local land use regulations); Michelman, supra note
1, at 327 (concluding that the Court may be giving the federal judiciary too much influence
in the enforcement of state property law).
182. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. As one scholar finds:
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question concerning what types of government action, legislative
and adjudicative, and how much government action, the means and
ends, can be examined under the Takings Clause.
The takings puzzle has been solved. Of course, its specific applications will always
remain contentious. As with other features of our constitutional system, a
"machine that would go by itself," takings analysis is subject to constant push and
counterpush; so too, the destiny of the countervailing property and police power
forces.
Kmiec, supra note 1, at 158 (footnote omitted).
The Court recently decided Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659
(1997). Although this is a ripeness case, the underlying dispute involved a regulatory taking.
Federal courts have often used the ripeness doctrine to avoid the constitutional questions
presented in many land use cases. See Gregory Overstreet, Update on the Continuing and
Dramatic Effect of the Ripeness Doctrine on Federal Land Use Litigation, 20 ZONING &
PLAN. L. REP. 17, 25 (1997). In Suitum, the Court narrowed the application of the final
decision requirement from Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1667. The decision could
effectively increase federal scrutiny of local land use decisions. Justice Scalia, in his
concurrence joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, believed that the issue was ripe for
adjudication arguing that the opinion of the Majority may have unnecessarily dealt with the
issue of transferable development rights in deciding the ripeness issue. See id. at 1670
(Scailia, J., concurring). If the transferable development rights are considered to be on the
taking side, rather than on the compensation side of the takings equation, this could, in
Justice Scalia's words, "render ... regulatory taking jurisprudence a nullity." Id. at 1672.
Once again, the Court may have added more confusion to the muddy waters of takings
jurisprudence.

